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Introduction
THE FORCES OF GLOBALIZATION during the past two decades
have been particularly powerful, but for many reasons, countries in
the Arab region have not participated in globalization to the extent
found in other regions of the world.1 Whereas most regions of the
world experienced a significant increase in global trade as a percent-
age of total gross domestic product ("GDP") between 1980 and 2004,
trade ratios in the Arab region actually declined during this time
period. 2
In its 2007 Economic Developments and Prospects report, the World
Bank found that "a legacy of protectionist trade and exchange rate
policies" hindered the Middle East and North Africa ("MENA") re-
gion's ability to expand trade and that the "region maintained the
highest level of tariff protection in the world outside of South Asia."
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1. See ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, A US-MIDDLE EAST TRADE AGREEMENT: A CIRCLE OF OP-
PORTUNrrY? 28-29 (2006) [hereinafter LAWRENCE, A US-MIDDLE EAST TRADE AGREEMENT]
(noting that between 1980 and 2004, global trade in goods and services as a percentage of
GDP increased by 32%).
2. See id. at 29, 30 tbl.2.2. "[B]etween 1980 and 2004, global trade in goods and
services as a percentage of GDP increased by 32%," id. at 29, but trade ratios in the Arab
region in 2004 were the same as they were in 1980, and in some cases, had even decreased.
See id. at 30 tbl.2.2.
3. WORLD BANK, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
AND PROSPECTS: JOB CREATION IN AN ERA OF HIGH GROWTH 74 (2007) [hereinafter Eco-
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These factors led the World Bank to conclude that countries in the
MENA region had all fallen behind in terms of "global trade and in-
vestment integration."4
At the start of the new millennium, many people inside and
outside of the Arab region began to question whether efforts should
be made to better integrate the Arab world into the changing global
economy.5 Notably, Saudi Oil Minister Ali Naimi publicly recognized
the benefits and challenges that globalization brings to the Arab
world:
We are transitioning to a global marketplace where tradi-
tional national borders are increasingly meaningless for the trans-
fer of capital and ideas. The operative word for the future is inter-
dependence. We are being drawn closer together by expanding
global trade and investment. Those attempting to "go-it-alone" in this
new global economy will risk being left behind.
Globalization holds the promise of a better way of life for the
world's people. But realizing this promise will not always be easy.
We will be faced with tradeoffs as we try to balance economic
growth, quality of life, the environment, culture and tradition.
6
In an effort to enhance Arab participation in the world's trading
regime, in 2003, United States President George W. Bush proposed an
initiative for a Middle East Free Trade Area ("MEFTA" or "MEFTA
Initiative") to promote trade, development, and economic growth in
the Arab region. 7 The MEFTA Initiative called for the United States to
take a series of graduated steps with countries in the region ultimately
aimed at creating a region-wide free trade area by 2013.8 The pro-
posed steps included: (1) United States assistance in acceding to the
NOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS], available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTMENA/Resources/EDP_2007_REPORTAug7.pdf.
4. WORLD BANK, MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: ENGAGING WITH THE WORLD 92 (2003), avail-
able at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/IO/
03/000094946_03092504152661/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
5. See id. at xv (describing "why engaging with the world is so vital for the [Arab]
region"); LAWRENCE, A US-MIDDLE EAST TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 1; Ali Naimi,
Saudi Oil Minister, Globalization and the Future of the Oil Market, Address to the World
Affairs Council of Northern California and Council on Foreign Relations at the Banker's
Club of San Francisco (May 23, 2005), in 48 MIDDLE E. ECON. SURV. (2005), available at
http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/v48n22-5OD01 .htm.
6. Naimi, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
7. See MARYJANE BOLLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, MIDDLE EAST FREE TRADE AREA:
PROGRESS REPORT 1 (2006), available at http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL32638.pdf;
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR"), Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative,
U.S. Regional Plan to Spur Economic Growth, www.ustr.gov/Trade.Agreements/
Regional/MEFTA/SectionIndex.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
8. See BOLLE, supra note 7; USTR, supra note 7.
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World Trade Organization ("WTO"); (2) expanding the Generalized
System of Preferences ("GSP") program for eligible countries; (3) es-
tablishing Trade and Investment Framework Agreements ("TIFAs");
(4) establishing Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs"); (5) negotiat-
ing comprehensive Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs"); and (6) eventu-
ally "melding" all the FTAs into a Middle East Free Trade Area.9 The
MEFTA Initiative also called for the United States to provide financial
and technical aid to countries for trade capacity building. 10
This Article" discusses: (1) whether external trade intervention,
such as the MEFTA Initiative proposed, will lead to greater economic
integration of the Arab world into the multilateral trading regime;
and (2) whether MEFTA can serve as the catalyst to enhance intra-
regional trade and investment.
Part I of this Article provides historical background related to
trade and globalization in the Arab world and discusses the histori-
cally low global and intra-regional trade and investment ratios found
in the MENA region.
Part II of this Article provides a detailed analysis of the United
States' MEFT'A Initiative, including its policy goals and components.
Part III analyzes the potential economic impact on the MENA
region of external trade intervention, such as WTO accession and the
MEFTA Initiative. Part III first addresses the potential impact of WTO
accession on the MENA region. Next, it addresses the potential eco-
nomic impact the MEFTA Initiative might have on Arab trade with the
United States. Lastly, Part III addresses whether the MEFTA Initiative
has the potential to spur an increase in intra-regional trade and
investment.
This Article concludes that external trade intervention, such as
WTO accession and the MEFTA Initiative, offers a dynamic opportu-
nity for the Arab region to better integrate into the world economy.
While the WTO provides the forum for the multilateral trading re-
9. See Robert B. Zoellick, USTR, Global Trade and the Middle East, Speech at the
World Economic Forum Uune 23, 2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_
Library/USTR_- Speeches/2003/GlobalTrade the MiddleEast.html?ht=.
10. See id. The United States would "help countries develop the capacity to take part
in negotiations, implement trade agreements, and build the legal and entrepreneurial in-
frastructure to partake in the benefits of open markets." Id.; see also BOLLE, supra note 7, at
9 (indicating that "[t]he final step in the Bush Administration's plan is trade-capacity
building to help countries realize more fully the benefits of open markets .... ").
11. This Article was originally presented at an economic conference entitled the Inter-
national Conference on Globalization, Economic Reforms, Aid and Democracy in the Arab World,
held at the Arab Thought Forum in Amman, Jordan on February 3-4, 2008.
Spring 2008]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
gime, the promise of MEFTA comes from its potential to encourage
economic and policy reforms within the Arab region that might ulti-
mately result in strengthened trade ties, both internationally and in-
tra-regionally.
I. Historical Context: The Arab Region's Historically Low
Trade Ratios
A. The Forces of Globalization Leave the Middle East Behind
As Renato Ruggiero, former Director-General of the WTO, suc-
cinctly stated, "A powerful confluence of forces drives globalization." 12
Some of these forces reflect government policies, and others are
forces that seem to have a life of their own. The forces of globalization
since the end of the Cold War have been particularly dramatic and
have led many to question why the Arab region has not participated in
globalization to the degree found elsewhere. 13
By the early 2000s, international institutions began to recognize
that the Middle East was largely missing out on trade-related growth. 14
According to United Nations ("UN") statistics at the time, "the [Mid-
dle East's] share of world exports peaked at 12% in 1981, but dropped
to less than 5% in 2001." 5 Regional trade was particularly low, and in
2001, it accounted for only 8% of the region's total trade, compared
to nearly 75% for Europe and 50% for Asia. 16 UN statistics further
revealed that "the Middle East attracted only 0.7% of global foreign
direct investment throughout the 1990[ ]s."' 7
In its 2003 MENA Development Report, the World Bank found that
the MENA countries had "entered the new millennium at a significant
deficit with respect to most other regions of the world in terms of its
integration into the world economy."1 8 While the volume of trade in-
creased in most regions of the world over the prior two decades, trade
12. Tim Kennedy, Experts Assess Saudi Arabia's Effort to Join the World Trade Organization,
WASH. TIMES (SPECIAL INT'L REPORT), Sept. 22, 2000, available at http://www.international
specialreports.com/middleeast/00/saudiarabia/6.html.
13. See LAWRENCE, A US-MIDDLE EAST TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 27-28.
14. E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Sec'y for Econ. & Bus. Affairs, Creating Free and
Dynamic Economies in the Arab World, Remarks to the International Arab Banking Sum-
mit, Montreal, Canada (June 25, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/rm/
2003/21945.htm.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 3, at 73.
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in the MENA region declined.1 9 The ratio of trade to GDP fell from
an average of 100% in 1980 to about 60% by 2000.20 Regional exports
were dominated by oil, and "[o]nly a few countries had established
growing non-oil export sectors."2 1
The MENA region also only attracted a negligible share (a mere
0.3%) of the world's foreign direct investment. 22 While many factors
affect the level of trade, the World Bank concluded that the MENA
region's ability to expand trade was "disadvantaged by a legacy of pro-
tectionist trade and exchange rate policies." 23 The World Bank fur-
ther found that "the [MENA] region maintained the highest level of
tariff protection in the world outside of South Asia, with simple aver-
age tariffs in MENA averaging almost 19 percent."24
The MENA region maintained high nontariff barriers, such as
price control measures, import licenses, and quota requirements. 25 In
addition, several factors increased the costs to trade, including
"[t]echnical barriers to trade, customs, and administrative proce-
dures, and costly and inefficient backbone services, such as transport,
logistics, ICT [information and communications technology] services,
and finance." 26
B. Arab Trade with Europe and the United States Is Low
An extensive study of trade in the Arab countries reveals "consid-
erable evidence that these [Arab] countries trade significantly less
than countries with similar incomes and geographic proximity to trad-
ing partners in other parts of the world." 27
In a paper presented to the World Bank, University of Southern
California Economics Professor Jeffrey Nugent used a gravity model28
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 74.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 74-75.
27. LAWRENCE, A US-MIDDLE EAST TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 29.
28. While a detailed discussion of international economics is beyond the scope of this
paper, "[t]he gravity model of trade predicts that the volume of trade between any two
countries will be positively related to the size of their economies (usually measured by
GDP) and inversely related to the trade costs between them." ROBERTA PIERMARTINI & ROB-
ERT TEH, WORLD TRADE ORG., WTO DiscussioN PAPERS No. 10, DEMYSTIMNG MODELLING
METHODS FOR TRADE POLICY 37 (2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/rese/
booksp e/discussion-paperslOe.pdf.
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specification to find that the Middle East traded under its potential in
the mid-1990s. 29 Professor Nugent "obtained shortfalls in trade with
respect to Europe and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which he ascribes to a variety of causes, including low oil
prices, high tariff barriers, poor telecommunications, capital and ex-
change controls, and ... trade diversion effects."30
Other studies using a gravity model specification also found that
almost all Arab countries were far below their estimated export poten-
tial with the European Union. 31 One such study examined fifteen
Arab countries' exports to Europe and concluded that, on average,
they were 33.5% lower than they would be, assuming that these coun-
tries' export behavior to the European Union market is identical to
any European Union country.32
The same conclusion is reached with respect to Arab trade with
the United States. A 2005 economic study that examined the bilateral
trade of six MENA countries (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Jor-
dan, and Syria) with the United States found that these countries "se-
riously underexploited their trade potential with the United States." 33
The study concluded that "in particular . . . the United States is a
major untapped market for Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia,
while Algeria and Egypt 'overexport' to the United States."34
C. Intra-Regional Trade is Low
Several studies in 2005 found that Arab countries do not trade
enough among themselves. One such study found that intra-regional
trade between Arab countries was nearly four times less than ex-
pected.35 Another study used a comprehensive gravity model that in-
cluded both policy and institutional factors to explain the trade
shortfalls of the MENA Region. 36 Researchers estimated the model
"with panel data techniques based on recently assembled panel data
on bilateral trade flows and the relevant explanatory variables for over
29. See LAWRENCE, A US-MIDDLE EAST TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 29.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 31.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 31-33.
34. Id. at 33.
35. Id. (footnote omitted).
36. Rania S. Miniesy & Jeffrey B. Nugent, Explaining the Trade Shortfalls of the MENA
Region (2005) (unpublished paper presented at the MEEA-ECOMOD Conference "Middle
Eastern and North African Economies: Past Perspectives and Future Challenges" held at
the Free University of Brussels, June 2-4, 2005), available at http://www.ecomod.net/
conferences/middleeast_2005/middle-east_2005_papers/Nugent.doc.
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150 countries for the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1997
and 2000.'37 This study verified that MENA trades too little, both in-
tra-regionally and with countries outside the MENA region. 38
H. The United States' Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative
In 2003, the United States, under the Bush administration, pro-
posed establishing a United States MEFTA by 2013.39 Under the
MEFTA Initiative, the United States would engage countries in the
MENA region in a step-by-step process designed to facilitate trade rela-
tions with the United States.40 The MEFTA Initiative envisioned that
these steps would lead to the negotiation of comprehensive bilateral
FTAs between the United States and all countries in the region.41 The
United States would then combine these into a single overarching ar-
rangement (i.e., MEFTA) between the United States and the region as
a whole.42 The following sections provide background on the reason-
ing behind the MEFTA Initiative and the step-by-step approach under
it.
A. Key Indicators of United States Economic Ties to the Middle
East
United States trade with the Middle East is a small share of total
United States trade, and in 2005, it accounted for only 4.1% of all
United States exports and 4.6% of all United States imports.43 These
low numbers indicate that on the basis of economic size alone, "the
Middle East is not a region on which the United States would nor-
mally be expected to focus." 44 The United States' interest in MEIFTA is
37. Id. A "panel[ ] data set is one that follows a given sample of individuals over time,
and thus provides multiple observations on each individual in the sample." CHENG HSIAO,
ANALYSIS OF PANEL DATA 1 (2d ed. 2003). See generally MANUEL ARELLANO, PANEL DATA
ECONOMETRICS (Manuel Arellano et al. eds. 2003) (indicating that panel date econometrics
uses both time series and cross-sectional data sets that have repeated observations over
time for the same individuals, such as workers, households, firms, industries, regions, or
countries). Numerous variables were used and included, among many others, GDP, bilat-
eral trade between countries, distance between countries, and physical country size. See
Jeffrey B. Nugent, Why Does MENA Trade So Little? 14-15 (Aug. 30, 2002) (unpublished
paper presented to the Middle East Region Group at the World Bank), available at http://
Inwebl 8.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/Nugent/$File/Nugent.pdf.
38. Miniesy & Nugent, supra note 36.
39. BOLLE, supra note 7.
40. See LAWRENCE, A US-MIDDLE EAST TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 2.
41. See id. at 2.
42. See id.
43. BOLLE, supra note 7, at 4.
44. See LAWRENCE, A US-MIDDLE EAST TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 4.
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not primarily economic; rather, it reflects "geopolitical and security
considerations" related to the United States' war on terror and the
Middle East's strategic position as a key supplier of oil and gas. 45 The
MEFTA Initiative also reflects the United States' policy perspective
that the Middle East region needs an economic component as part of
a comprehensive strategy to address the numerous conflicts facing the
region.46
B. Background on the Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative
Initiated just a year and a half after the September 11, 2001 ter-
rorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Bush administration
proposed the MEFTA Initiative as part of a plan to fight terrorism
through the use of trade policy mechanisms designed to encourage
economic growth and democratic reforms in the Middle East
region.47
The MEFTA Initiative incorporated an idea that was being de-
bated in Washington at the time-using trade as a tool to fight terror-
ism. For example, prior to the announcement of MEFTA, policy
analyst Edward Gresser argued that the Arab world had been the
"blank spot" on the Bush administration's trade agenda and that this
"undermin[ed], rather than support[ed], the war on terrorism. '48
Gresser noted the "economic crisis affecting almost all of the western
Muslim states" and noted that these states had "seen their share of
world trade and investment collapse since 1980."49 This resulted in
"stagnant growth and falling income," as well as "unemployment, po-
litical tension, and rising appeal for religious extremists. '50 Gresser
further argued that "a strategic initiative for the Muslim world could
end, or at least ease, the tilt."5 1 Gresser called for an initiative "analo-
gous to programs now available for Central America, the Andean
nations, and Africa" in order to promote "growth and creation,
45. See id. at 5; BOLLE, supra note 7, at 4.
46. See BOLLE, supra note 7, at 1-2; LAWRENCE, A US-MIDDLE EAST TRADE AGREEMENT,
supra note 1, at 2-3.
47. See BOLLE, supra note 7.
48. EDWARD GRESSER, PROGRESSIVE POL'Y INST., BLANK SPOT ON THE MAP: How TRADE
POLICY IS WORKING AGAINST THE WAR ON TERROR 1 (2003), available at http://www.ppion
line.org/documents/MuslimTrade_0203.pdf.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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and so reduc[e] the attraction of radicalism and religious funda-
mentalism." 52
Brink Lindsey of the CATO Institute argued for an initiative that
could generate immediate results to supplement the Bush administra-
tion's pursuit of FTAs, which take longer to negotiate. 53 The short-
term initiative Lindsey proposed was legislation that would grant "4tem-
porary duty-free, quota-free access to the U.S. market for exports of
selected Muslim countries. 54 Lindsey argued that this shorter-term
program would prove the United States' "commitment to the region,
thereby providing a jump-start for the longer, arduous process of ne-
gotiating F-As."55
The policy objectives Gresser and Lindsey suggested were later
supported by The 9-11 Commission Report, which included the following
recommendation: "A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terror-
ism should include economic policies that encourage development,
more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives
of their families and to enhance prospects for their children's fu-
ture. '56 In summary, the premise of the United States' MEFTA Initia-
tive was that an economic boost to the region could help alleviate the
poverty, weak institutions, and corruption that were believed to make
some countries vulnerable to terrorist networks.57
On June 23, 2003, at the World Economic Forum in Jordan,
United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick provided further
details on the MEFTA Initiative. 58 In terms of eligibility, the Bush ad-
ministration's MEFTA Initiative is open to: (1) "'peaceful' countries
that seek an increased trade relationship with the United States"; and
(2) "all those countries that are prepared to participate in economic
reform and liberalization. '59
Ambassador Zoellick outlined a six-step process, or "roadmap to
MEFTA," for Middle East countries to become part of MEFTA. 60
52. Id.
53. See BRINK LINDSEY, CATO INST., THE TRADE FRONT: COMBATING TERRORISM WITH
OPEN MARKETS 3 (2003), available at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-024.pdf. The
CATO Institute is a non-profit public policy research foundation. CATO's website: http://
www.cato.org/.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9-11 COMMISSION RE-
PORT 379 (2004).
57. See LINDSEY, supra note 53, at 2.
58. See Zoellick, supra note 9.
59. BOLLE, supra note 7, at 9.
60. See Zoellick, supra note 9.
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These six steps included: (1) the United States assisting countries in
joining the WTO; (2) participating in the GSP;61 (3) entering into
TIFAs; (4) entering into BITs; (5) entering into FTAs with the United
States; and (6) eventually "melding... subregional FTAs into an his-
toric regional [MEFTA]. '"62 Ambassador Zoellick also indicated that
"the final element" of the MEFA Initiative included the United
States providing financial and technical aid to fund trade capacity
building in the region.63 As envisioned, MEFTA would ultimately
cover twenty countries in the Middle East 64 and North Africa 65 region.
C. The Step-by-Step Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative
1. World Trade Organization Accession
It is the United States' position that Arab countries that join the
rules-based system of global trade by accession to the WTO will be
better able to take advantage of the benefits of open markets and
globalization. 66
At the beginning of the new millennium, nine countries in the
MEFTA region were members of the WTO: Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt,
Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emir-
ates6 7 ("UAE"). Over the past seven years, three additional MEFTA
countries have joined the WTO: Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. 68
In April 2000, Jordan became the 136th member of the WTO six
years after establishing a working party under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade69 ("GATT") and with significant assistance from
61. The GSP is "a program designed to promote economic growth in the developing
world [and] provides preferential duty-free entry for more than 4,650 products from 143
designated beneficiary countries and territories." USTR, Generalized System of Prefer-
ences, http://www.ustr.gov/TradeDevelopment/Preference-Programs/GSP/Section_
Index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
62. See Zoellick, supra note 9.
63. See id.
64. These countries include: Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, the Gaza Strip/West Bank, Iran,
Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab
Emirates ("UAE"), and Yemen. BOLLE, supra note 7, at 15 tbl.2.
65. These countries include: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. Id.
66. See BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, MIDDLE EAST FREE TRADE AREA
INITIATIVE (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/68344.pdf.
67. See infta Table 1.
68. See infra Table 1.
69. Press Release, WTO,Jordan Becomes 136th Member of the IATO (Apr. 11, 2000),
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/presOO_e/pr174_e.htm [hereinafter Press Release,
WTO, Jordan) (reporting that Jordan became a member of the WTO in 2000 after first
establishing a working party under the GATT in January 1994). "The working party on
[Vol. 42
GLOBALIZATION AND TRADE INITIATIVES
the United States.70 Jordan's accession was hailed as a "historical mo-
ment" and "a turning point in the continued development of the
Jordanian economy." 7' In November 2000, the Sultanate of Oman be-
came the 139th member of the WTO after concluding negotiations
that began in 1996.72 In December 2005, Saudi Arabia became the
149th member of the WNTO after almost twelve years of negotiation. 73
Saudi Arabia's accession was a historic day for the WTO and brought
to the "multilateral table" the thirteenth largest merchandise exporter
and the twenty-third largest importer.74 Given its position as the
"swing" energy producer and its historical lack of transparency, Saudi
Arabia is perhaps the most significant Arab state to join the WNTO.
All but one of the remaining MEF-IA countries (Algeria, Iran,
Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen) are in the process of negotiating their
accession to the WNTO. 75 The only exception is Libya, which has been
granted observer status but has not yet started the accession process. 76
As a practical matter, however, WNTO accession takes years, and
the United States has recognized that WNTO accession is not an imme-
diate answer to United States security concerns related to the Arab
Jordan's accession to the GATT/WATO was established under the GATT in 1994 and was
transformed into a WNTO working party in 1995." Id.
70. See U.S. Agency Int'l Dev. ("USAID"), USAID in Jordan, http://www.usaidjordan.
org/aboutussubsub.cfm?id=71&section=history (last visited Apr. 23, 2008) ("USAID coop-
erated closely with Jordanian counterparts to help facilitate Jordan's accession into the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and implement needed policy reforms.").
71. Press Release, WTO, Jordan, supra note 69 (quoting Dr. M. Halaiqah, Chief Nego-
tiator and Secretary General of the Ministry of Industry and Trade ofJordan at the General
Council Meeting).
72. Press Release, WTO, WTO's General Council Approves Accession of Oman (Oct.
10, 2000), http://www.wto.org./english/news.e/presOOe/pr194-e.htm (reporting that
the Sultanate of Oman will become the 139th Member of the MITO on November 9, 2000).
73. Press Release, WTO, WAITO General Council Successfully Adopts Saudi Arabia's
Terms of Accession (Nov. 11, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/news.e/pres05-e/
pr420_e.htm (indicating that Saudia Arabia had been negotiating its membership in the
WTO since 1993).
74. WTO, 2005 News Items, Welcoming Address by the Director-General to the King-
dom of Saudi Arabia (Nov. 11, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news05.e/
statlamyl 1 nov05-e.htm.
75. See WTO, Members and Observers (July 27, 2007), http://www.wto.org/englizh/
thewtoe/whatis.e/tif.e/org6_e.htm (listing the member countries of the WITO and the
dates of membership).
76. See WTO, 2004 News Items, Libya Given Green Light to Negotiate WTO Member-
ship (July 28, 2004), http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news4_e/libya-stat.27july04-
e.htm. Libya applied to become a WTO member in December 2001, and the WATO General
Council agreed to set up a working party to examine Libya's application on July 27, 2004.
Id. "As an applicant country, Libya [is also] an observer to the WTO during the member-
ship negotiation." Id.
Spring 20081
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
region. 77 As former United States Trade Representative Charlene Bar-
shefsky acknowledged, "programs of a more immediate nature" are
"critical to bring economic and job growth to [the MENA] region to
provide hope and a counterweight to a large growing, relatively well-
educated but unemployed population. '78 Barshefsky also recognized
the need for greater economic integration in the region by stating
that "we need the kind of relief that may help these countries inte-
grate one with the other."79
2. Continuation of the Generalized System of Preferences
The short term plan under MEFTA includes the continuation of
the GSP, which allows duty-free entry into the United States market
for at least 3500 products from 140 developing countries.80 As of 2006,
only eight of the twenty countries covered under MEFTA were eligible
for GSP benefits: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Tuni-
sia, and Yemen. 81
The GSP provisions of the United States' Trade Act of 19742 also
limit product preferences on the basis of import sensitivity.83 GSP pro-
visions specifically exclude from tariff preferences certain textiles and
apparel, watches, footwear, handbags, luggage, wallets and briefcases,
work gloves and other leather wearing apparel, steel, glass, and elec-
tronics.84 Because these are important export categories for MEFTA
countries, imports under GSP represent only a small fraction (0.2%
for 2005) of all imports from the MEFTA region. 85
77. The Arab region includes: Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, the Gaza Strip/West Bank,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the UAE,
and Yemen. See BOLLE, supra note 7, at 15 tbl.2.
78. Analysis: US-Middle East Free Trade Zone (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast June 3, 2003),
available at http://www.npr.org/programs/totn/transcripts/2003/un/030603.barsh.html
(explaining that the United States created a duty free program forJordanian-Israeli goods
to enter the United States and also negotiated an FTA with Jordan to assist with WTO
accession).
79. Id.
80. BOLLE. supra note 7, at 7.
81. Id. "GSP limits country participation on the basis of: (a) per-capita income, and
(b) participation in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)." Id.
82. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (2000).
83. See id. § 2461 (giving the president the authority to "provide duty-free treatment
for any eligible article from any beneficiary developing country," taking into account vari-
ous factors). Import sensitivity refers to the "vulnerability of a domestic industry to injury
from foreign competition." INST. FOR TRADE & COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY, GLOSSARY (2004),
http://www.itcdonline.com/introduction/glossarylghij.html.
84. BOLLE, supra note 7, at 7 n.12.
85. Id.
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3. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements
TIFAs "establish a framework for expanding trade and for resolv-
ing outstanding disputes. ' 86 Since the MEFTA Initiative was an-
nounced in 2003, the United States has negotiated new TIFAs with
eight countries: Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, and Yemen. 87 Nearly three-quarters of the MEFTA entities
(fourteen) now have TIFAs with the United States. 88 The six MEFTA
entities that do not have TIFAs with the United States are: Cyprus, the
Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Iran, Libya, and Syria. 89
4. Bilateral Investment Treaties
"[ ]BITs[] oblige governments to treat foreign investors fairly
and to offer them legal protections equal to those afforded domestic
investors," and they make the business climate of a country more at-
tractive to United States companies. 90
Since the MEFTA Initiative was announced, the United States
and Jordan have approved a BIT.91 Subsequently, the United States
now has BITs with more than one-quarter of the MEFTA entities:
Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. 92
The following fourteen MEFTA entities do not have BITs with the
United States: Algeria, Cyprus, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
the UAE, and Yemen.
5. Free Trade Agreements
Since the MEFTA Initiative was announced, the United States
completed FTAs with Bahrain, Morocco, and Oman, and an FTA with
86. Robert B. Zoellick, USTR, Op-Ed., A Return to the Cradle of Free Trade, WASH-
INGTONPOST.COM, June 23, 2003, http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Op-eds/2003/
A_Return-to-theCradleofFree_Trade.html?ht=.
87. See infra Table 1; see also USTR, Trade and Investment Framework Agreements
(TIFAs), http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/TIFA/Section-Index.html (last visited
Apr. 6, 2008). This list erroneously omits Oman, which signed a TIFA with the United
States on July 7, 2004. See Press Release, USTR, United States and Oman Sign Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (July 7, 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/Document_
Library/PressReleases/2004/July/UnitedStates_OmanSignjTradeInvestmentFrame
workAgreement.html?ht=.2.
88. BOLLE, supra note 7, at 10. TIFAs were already in place (prior to 2003) with
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. See id. at 10, 15 tbl.2.
89. See id. at 15 tbl.2; infra Table 1.
90. BOLLE, supra note 7, at 8.
91. Id. at 10.
92. See id.; infra Table 1.
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the UAE is under negotiation. 93 FTAs were already in effect for Israel
and Jordan. 94 Some have questioned whether these FTAs will be effec-
tive, and in light of the MENA region's historical reluctance "to en-
gage in . . . fundamental systemic changes," some skepticism is
probably warranted. 95 Some have also questioned the benefits of the
F-TAs in light of the relatively modest trade and investment links be-
tween the Arab countries and the United States.96
Although some skepticism might be warranted, it is important to
note that the FTAs with Bahrain, Morocco, and Oman are particularly
striking because of their "comprehensive and deep character. '9 7 Un-
like other FTAs, these new FIAs require liberalization for trade in all
goods, including agriculture, and for many services and foreign direct
investment.9 8 The requirements of the FTAs are enforced by dispute
settlement agreements backed by the possibility of the suspension of
trade concessions or preferences, payment of monetary assessments by
violators of FTAs, or both.99
The "deep character" of these FTAs is significant because, with
the exception of the Gulf Cooperation Council, most previous agree-
ments that Arab countries signed-both with the European Union
and amongst themselves-generally dealt only with tariffs and quo-
tas.10 0 Although tariffs in the region have been reduced, Arab coun-
tries "have failed ... to deal effectively with non-tariff barriers and the
liberalization of services and investment."' 0'1
A strong argument can be made that the deep nature of the
United States' FTAs in the MENA region presents a unique opportu-
nity for the Arab states to implement additional policy measures, both
individually and collectively.' 0 2 Thus, "[t]he promise of the [IFAs]
comes from the ability to use them as a catalyst for increased eco-
93. BOLLE, supra note 7, at 10. The United States and the UAE launched negotiations
in March 2005. See USTR, supra note 7.
94. Id.
95. Robert Z. Lawrence, Recent US Free Trade Initiatives in the Middle East: Opportunities
but No Guarantees 3 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Harvard Univ., Faculty Research Work-
ing Paper Series No. RWP06-050, 2006) [hereinafter Lawrence, Recent US Free Trade Initia-
tives], available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/lawrencel206.pdf.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 4.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 4, 19.
100. Id. at 4-5.
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id. Some policy measures that Lawrence suggested include: domestic reforms to
improve the regulatory environment for businesses; greater regulatory transparency; im-
provements in customs procedures; and better intellectual property protection. Id. at 23.
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nomic benefits by improving regulatory rules and systems at home
and facilitating integration with the rest of the region and the
world."103
6. The Creation of a Middle East Free Trade Area
As Ambassador Zoellick outlined, the MEFTA Initiative envisions
the "eventual melding of [the] subregional FTAs into an historic re-
gional Middle East Free Trade Area." 10 4 The difficulty of ultimately
establishing one MEFTA has been recognized, 10 5 and Ambassador
Zoellick noted, at the time, that a MEFTA "will not be created in a
month, a year, or even five years. But America is committed for the
long haul, through a step-by-step strategy for progress that will help
nations build free, dynamic economies and rising standards of living
for all."' 0 6
The final element that Ambassador Zoellick noted in the MEFTA
Initiative is "the. [United States'] provision of financial and technical
aid to help countries develop the capacity to take part in negotiations,
implement trade agreements, and build the legal and entrepreneurial
infrastructure to partake in the benefits of open markets."'' 0 7
To fund trade capacity building under the MEFTA Initiative,
"[t]he Middle East Partnership Initiative ["MEPI"] will help target
more than $1 billion of annual funding from various U.S. Govern-
ment agencies and encourage partnerships with private organizations
and businesses that support development."'0 8
The MEPI "is also aimed at increasing educational opportunities,
strengthening civil society and rule of law, and supporting small busi-
ness." 109 The MEPI received an estimated $294 million in funding be-
tween fiscal years 2002 and 2005.' 10 For 2005, total funding for United
103. Id. at 5.
104. Zoellick, supra note 9.
105. LAWRENCE, A US-MIDDLE EAST TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that
"even aside from the obvious political problems of achieving a single MEFTA that includes
Israel and all the Arab countries, there are numerous institutional barriers to its full reali-
zation"). See also id. at 55-77, for a more detailed discussion of the issues related to creat-
ing a single MEIFTA.
106. Zoellick, supra note 9.
107. Id. It should be noted that for some reason both Bolle and Lawrence treat trade
capacity as step six, whereas Ambassador Zoellick's speech identified trade capacity build-
ing as an "element" and not a step. See BOLLE, supra note 7, at 9; LAWRENCE, A US-MIDDLE
EAsT TRADE AGREEMEN-r, supra note 1, at 2.
108. Zoellick, supra note 9. MEPI is the trade capacity building program that MEFTA
uses. See id.
109. BOLLE, supra note 7, at 9.
110. Id.
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States trade capacity building was $1.3 billion, of which Middle East
countries received $236 million, or 18%. 111
II. The Economic Impact of External Trade Intervention
As the World Bank's 2007 Economic Developments and Prospects re-
port for the MENA Region notes, "The relationship between openness
to international trade and income growth is almost axiomatic....
economies with greater openness to international trade experience
higher rates of economic growth, as a result of both higher investment
levels and sustained gains in productivity."' 1 2 Perhaps of greater signif-
icance to the Arab region is the ancillary benefit that greater openness
can "motivate the overall reform agenda."'113 Over the past several
years, countries in the MEFTA region have embarked on a variety of
trade reforms designed "to liberalize their trade regimes and remove
the many existing impediments to greater trade."114
A. The Impact of World Trade Organization Accession
Since the beginning of the new millennium, three MENA coun-
tries have joined the WTO: Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.1 15 As a
result of WTO accession, MENA countries as a whole have made sig-
nificant progress in tariff reduction since the start of the decade.1 16
In particular, Jordan made significant commitments in trade re-
form as a condition of its accession to the WTO in 2000 and the im-
plementation of the United States ETA in 2001.117 Tariffs decreased
by about half from an average of 23% in 2000 to less than 12% by
2005.118
The most recent Arab member of the WTO is Saudi Arabia,
which was admitted in 2005.119 In order to meet WTO requirements,
Saudi Arabia revised many of its protective trade policies, particularly
with respect to import licensing, customs valuation and fees, standards
111. Id.
112. ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 3, at 73 (footnotes omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 75. For example, additional countries from the MENA region (Jordan,
Oman, and Saudi Arabia) have acceded to the WTO, and numerous bilateral and regional
trade agreements have entered into force in the region. Id. As a result of the various trade
agreements, MENA countries made significant progress in reducing tariffs. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 76.
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and technical regulations, and legislation for intellectual property
rights and patent registration. 120
Relative to the world, tariff reform by MENA countries since 2000
has been higher than any other region but Europe and Central Asia,
ranking in the top sixty-second percentile of countries worldwide.121
Despite the progress MENA countries have made in the WTO,
recent WTO reports indicate that more structural reforms need to oc-
cur.122 For example, in 2006 the WTO conducted its first ever Trade
Policy Review of the UAE. 123 The WTO's Trade Policy Review found
that the UAE's generally liberal economy had grown by an average of
6% per year over the past decade and 9% between 2003 and 2005.124
Despite some diversification, however, the UAE remains dependent
on crude oil and gas exports for a significant share of its national in-
come.1 25 The WTO Secretariat noted that "internal barriers to trade,
resulting largely from the absence of a competition policy, institu-
tional weaknesses, and restrictions on foreign participation in the
economy, are impediments to doing business in the UAE and are hin-
dering the diversification into services, a sector that is rapidly becom-
ing a strategic priority."'126
B. The Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative's Potential Impact
on Arab Trade with the United States
The relatively small value of bilateral trade between Arab coun-
tries and the United States implies that the economic impact of
MEFTA will be marginal. Since the United States has historically
charged very low duties on imports from Arab countries (just over
0.5% in 2003),127 it is unlikely that MEFTA will significantly increase
exports from Arab countries to the United States. Rather, the more
120. Id.
121. Id. at 77 (footnote omitted).
122. Press Release, WTO, Trade Policy Review: United Arab Emirates (UAE), A Gener-
ally Liberal Economy Whose Performance Could Further Improve with Structural Reform
(Apr. 24 & 26, 2006), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr_e/tp263_e.htm.
123. Id. "Trade Policy Reviews are an exercise, mandated in the WTO agreements, in
which member countries' trade and related policies are examined and evaluated at regular
intervals." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See LAWRENCE, A US-MIDDLE EAsT TA.DE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 106; Law-
rence, Recent US Free Trade Initiatives, supra note 95, at 16.
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likely result of tariff reductions under MEFTA is that imports from the
United States will increase) 28
Focusing exclusively on the effects of eliminating tariffs on goods,
however, runs the risk of seriously understating the impact of the
MEFTA agreements, especially the FTAs. Some argue that "[t] he addi-
tional effects of reducing non-tariff barriers and the liberalization of
services trade and foreign investment should not be ignored," and
"[s]imulations of these additional effects suggest they could be
large."1 29 For example, estimates using Tunisia and Egypt indicate
that "liberalization of foreign investment in services that is generalized
to all trading partners could boost welfare by almost ten percent of
GDP."130
Simulation models often assume the structure of trade will re-
main unchanged, which can lead to misleading results.' 3 ' For exam-
ple, the International Trade Commission's analysis of the United
States-Jordan FTA completely missed the explosion in Jordan's ex-
ports of clothing to the United States as a result of special trade con-
cessions that the United States granted Jordan. 132 Indeed, the United
States-Jordan FTA provides valuable insight into the impact that
stronger trade and investment relations can have on economic devel-
opment. As a result of the various trade agreements between the
United States and Jordan, Jordan's exports to the United States "grew
from $13 million in 1999 to $412 million in 2002; created over 30,000
direct new jobs, and attracted over $200 million in new investment
from 11 different countries.' 33 Recent data is even more impressive:
'Jordanian exports to the US increased from $72.8 million in 2000 to
a stunning $1.267 billion in 2005 .... ,,134
General trade data also suggests that United States' exports to
and imports from the MENA region have increased since MEFTA was
announced. 13 5 "Between the end of 2002 and the end of 2005... U.S.
exports to the [MENA] countries grew by 56% while U.S. imports
from these entities nearly doubled."' 3 6 The greatest growth in United
States imports from the MENA region was in petroleum and natural
128. See Lawrence, Recent US Free Trade Initiatives, supra note 95, at 16.
129. Id. (footnote omitted).
130. Id. (citation omitted).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 17.
133. Wayne, supra note 14.
134. Lawrence, Recent US Free Trade Initiatives, supra note 95, at 17.
135. See BOLLE, supra note 7, at 6.
136. Id.
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gas. 1 3 7 Imports of nonmetallic mineral manufactures, medicinal and
pharmaceutical products, and organic chemicals also increased. 138
Goods making large contributions to the growth in United States ex-
ports to the MENA region included transport equipment, road vehi-
cles, electrical and non-electrical machinery, non-metallic mineral
manufactures, telecommunications, and scientific instruments.1 39
C. The Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative May Lead to
Increased Intra-Regional Trade
According to the Bush administration, the six-step MEEFA Initia-
tive is aimed at addressing political, economic, and humanitarian
objectives to assist the Middle East countries in becoming "sustainable
trading partners.' 140 "The hope is that each of the successive steps
involved in negotiating TIFAs, BITs, and FTAs might help induce in-
ternal changes in the laws and regulations of the various countries.' '1 41
One of the stated goals of the MEFTA Initiative was also to en-
courage intra-regional trade. 142 Prior to the announcement of the
MEFTA Initiative, intra-regional trade accounted for only 8% of the
total trade in the region.1 43 The United States intended to "focus ef-
forts on improving this number," noting that "[s] trong regional ties
often lead to rapid expansion in trade flows and economic growth." 144
Thus, the United States hoped and expected that, as its bilateral trade
and ties expand in the region, "trade among the countries in the re-
gion [would] also grow and expand. '145
The Arab countries that have signed agreements with the United
States should use them as an opportunity to enhance Arab regional
integration by extending the MEETA provisions and coverage to each
other. They should also use the agreements to leverage trade and in-
vestments liberalization with other trading partners.
If the MEFTA provisions are extended throughout the region,
then there is likely to be a measurable increase in intra-regional trade.
137. Id. During this time period, petroleum and natural gas prices and volume traded
increased, which affected imports. Id.
138. Id. at 6-7.
139. Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
140. Id. at 10 (quoting transcript of Background Press Conference Call to Discuss Pro-
posed Mideast Free Trade Area Announced by President Bush, May 9, 2003).
141. Id.
142. Wayne, supra note 14.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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At this point, it is unclear whether the Arab countries will apply the
MEFTA provisions intra-regionally and whether the potential for in-
creased intra-regional trade under MEFTA will be realized.
IV. Conclusion
The Arab world has enjoyed spectacular rates of growth for the
past four years. While high oil prices have spurred this growth, there is
no doubt that intensified global trade linkages have also contributed.
When the MEFTA Initiative was announced in 2003, the stated
goal was to conclude the plan in a decade, by 2013. This was an ambi-
tious goal at the time, and the United States has recently indicated
that the overall objective of MEFTA "was not to meet the deadline but
to push the reform process in the region along. '146
Scholars generally agree that the MEFTA Initiative is a step in the
right direction and that the deep nature of the MEFTA initiatives
presents a dynamic opportunity for Arab countries to implement eco-
nomic reforms that will allow the region to better integrate into the
multilateral trading regime. It remains to be seen whether countries
in the MENA region will continue to move the reform process along,
but it is evident that the Arab countries that do not embrace the
changes necessary to compete in the new global economy will "risk
being left behind."
146. Gary G. Yerkey, Bush's Plan to Create Mideast Free Trade Area by 2013 Could Take Off
This Year, 23 INT'L TRADE REP. 103 (2006).
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TABLE 1:
Entities Covered by the MEFIA Initiative: Progress Toward a
Bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the United States
wro
MEFrA Entity Membership GSP TIFA BIT FrA
Middle East
Bahrain
Cyprus
Egypt
Gaza Strip/West Bank
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syria
UAE
Yemen
North Affica
Algeria
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
1995
1995
1995
Negotiating
Negotiating
1995
2000
1995
Negotiating
2000
1996
2005
1996
Negotiating
(Note b)
Negotiating
Observer
1995
1995
-- 2002
Yes 1999
Yes 2005
- Yes
Yes Yes
- 2004
Yes 2006
Yes 2004
- 2004
- 2003
-- 2004
Yes 2004
2001
Yes
2002
2001
1992
Yes
2003
2006
Note a
Note a
1985
2001
2006
-- Negotiating
1991
1993
2006
Source of data: WTO/USTR: Adopted from CRS Report 32638
Note a: Goods are eligible for United States free trade benefits under a 1996
amendment to the United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act
of 1985, Pub. L. No. 104-234, 110 Stat. 3058 (1996) (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. § 2112 note (2000)), if co-produced with Israel,Jordan, or Egypt in
a Qualifying Industrial Zone in compliance with rules of origin requirements,
or wholly produced in the Gaza Strip/West Bank.
Note b: The WTO General Council established a Working Party to examine
Yemen's request for accession in July 2000. The fourth meeting of the
Working Party took place in November 2007, at which time the government
of Yemen highlighted its determination to address the WTO accession
requirements in 2008 in order to become a member in 2009.
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